International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education
Volume 12
Number 2 Volume 12, Issue 2

Article 2

12-19-2019

Towards a “Rescue Ready” Mindset: Can Lifeguard Teams Learn
Lessons from the Attributes of Chronic Unease?
Billy RJ Doyle
Piha Lifeguard Service, New Zealand, billydoyle.email@gmail.com

Jonathon Webber
Piha Lifeguard Service, New Zealand, j.webber@auckland.ac.nz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/ijare
Part of the Curriculum and Instruction Commons, Educational Assessment, Evaluation, and Research
Commons, Exercise Science Commons, Health and Physical Education Commons, Public Health
Commons, Sports Sciences Commons, and the Sports Studies Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Doyle, Billy RJ and Webber, Jonathon (2019) "Towards a “Rescue Ready” Mindset: Can Lifeguard Teams
Learn Lessons from the Attributes of Chronic Unease?," International Journal of Aquatic Research and
Education: Vol. 12: No. 2, Article 2.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.25035/ijare.12.02.01
Available at: https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/ijare/vol12/iss2/2

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ScholarWorks@BGSU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education by an authorized editor of
ScholarWorks@BGSU.

Towards a “Rescue Ready” Mindset: Can Lifeguard Teams Learn Lessons from
the Attributes of Chronic Unease?
Cover Page Footnote
The authors would like to thank the lifeguards who shared this valuable case study.

This research article is available in International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education:
https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/ijare/vol12/iss2/2

Doyle and Webber: Lifeguarding Case Study Chronic Unease

Abstract
Highly Reliable Organisations (HROs) are safety-centric organisations that
operate in complex environments alongside risky technologies and processes.
There is a high risk of catastrophe and error in these settings, the consequences
of which may result in loss of life, financial cost, and damage to the
environment. “Chronic unease” is a concept originally adopted by Royal Dutch
Shell describing a mindset that has five predictable attributes that contribute to
an individual’s and organisational safety culture. The authors of this paper
describe the attributes of chronic unease in the context of lifeguard operations.
A case study of a dangerous and dynamic rescue situation from a popular New
Zealand beach is presented and analysed wearing a ‘cloak of chronic unease’ to
draw upon the attributes of this concept and to present a discussion about how
lifeguards, their managers, and leaders may learn valuable lessons from HROs
to develop safer operations by fostering a similar mindset we have dubbed: “The
Rescue-Ready” mindset.
Keywords: lifeguarding, lifeguard safety, rescue, human factors, error, risk
management, highly reliable organisations, rescue-ready, chronic unease
Introduction
Drowning is a leading cause of preventable mortality and morbidity globally in
both high income (HIC) and low- and medium-income countries (LMIC)
(WHO, 2015). Lifeguarding is a complex task undertaken in an uncontrolled
environment with multiple risks including potential harm to the rescuer, harm
to those being supervised (if things go wrong), requiring high levels of
vigilance, skill, and a constant state of readiness. Most of the time, lifeguards
are engaged in surveillance of in-water patrons requiring complex decisionmaking processes based on mostly incomplete information. Occasionally, these
decisions are made under duress where the stakes are high and limited resources
available to deal with a crisis or emergency. Failures detecting drowning
behaviour or failure to rescue a drowning victim in a timely manner may result
in tragedy as the process of drowning can occur within seconds to minutes.
In this paper, we discuss the lessons learnt from Highly Reliable
Organisations (HROs) that encourage a concept called “Chronic Unease” as a
platform for developing a robust safety culture. These lessons may be applicable
for lifeguards, lifeguard team leaders, or managers of lifeguard services as a
way of striving to reduce systemic failure, errors, and accidents by frontline
lifeguards, and may provide a useful ‘world view’ to adopt by operational
lifeguards.
What is chronic unease?
“Chronic unease refers to the experience of discomfort and concern about the
management of risks. It is a healthy scepticism about one's own decisions and
the risks that are inherent in work environments” (Fruhen, 2015). Chronic
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unease is a concept originally developed by the oil and gas industry (Shell
Contractor, 2019) as a feature of working towards the goal of zero harm within
their industry. When things go wrong on an oil drilling rig, they typically go
spectacularly wrong and result in catastrophic harm, including massive loss of
life, environmental damage, and significant financial costs. While chronic
unease is primarily a state that typically influences executives and senior
management, safety experts researching this area propose that an organisation
(at every level from worker to senior managers), in a constant state of unease,
will critically support the organisation’s safety record. Chronic unease is a
hallmark of all HROs (Fruhen, 2015).
Chronic unease is a mindset typically adopted by senior managers but
permeates all levels in an organisation with a highly robust safety culture. It
fosters a healthy world view that:
1. Mentally projects the development of a situation into the future based on its
current state.
2. Does not expect something to be wrong but is constantly on guard and
prepared when things do go wrong.
3. Constantly looks for weak signals that may indicate that there is a hole in
the system, and even small events, no matter how minor, could lead to
greater failure, so action is taken immediately versus being delayed.
4. Assumes nothing, questions assumptions, and does not jump to conclusions.
5. Constantly worries (healthily) about safety and risk.
These five attributes of chronic unease will be explored within the
context of lifeguarding, and the application of this world view will be discussed
with examples provided. Given the complexity of the tasks of lifeguarding, and
in some cases the high-risk environments they operate in (coupled with the high
potential for error that may result in catastrophe), we propose lifeguard services
can improve their level of safety by fostering the attributes of chronic unease at
all levels of operations.
What are Highly Reliable Organisations (HROs)?
Highly Reliable Organisations is a term first described in the 1990s for
organisations that are recognised for avoiding catastrophic accidents where
accidents are expected due to the high-risk activity and complexity of the tasks
they complete (Roberts, 1990). They have managed safety and risk over a long
period of time in high-risk contexts and often operate in difficult social and
political environments, utilise risky technologies with a high potential for error,
and the scale of possible consequences from failure precludes experimentation
with safety systems. HROs are diverse and not limited to industry. A wide and
diverse range of HROs and their systems have been studied and identified.
These range from air traffic control systems, fire command systems (Bigley,
2001), and some high-risk medical treatment facilities such as paediatric
intensive care units (Madsen, 2006) .
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HROs have developed robust safety cultures, and think and act about error,
accidents, and near-misses quite differently to other organisations. They
encourage mindful reporting, investigate root causes, and continually strive for
zero harm to personnel, the environment, and assets. “HROs use mindful
organising for the unexpected as well as the expected” (Weick K, 2007).
A Case Study as a Basis for Examining the Utility of Chronic Unease
Attributes
We present a case study of an actual incident involving a lifeguard team working
at a popular surf beach on Auckland’s West Coast in New Zealand. For reasons
of confidentiality, names and dates have been changed, but the essential facts
surrounding the events remain intact.
Background
These events occurred on an outgoing tide on a crowded (approximately 1,500
patrons) beach between the flagged patrol area (in New Zealand, the
recommended swimming area where intensive lifeguard surveillance occurs is
marked with red and yellow flags). The surf was large (approximately 2.02.5m), and there was a considerable inshore drift towards two large fixed rips
and both ends of the beach (the beach is approximately 800m long). The
lifeguard team consisted of six lifeguards; the team leader was highly
experienced with over twenty years’ experience. The rest of the team were
similarly skilled and experienced except for one lifeguard who was a foreign
national on an international exchange programme. The team leader was
prepared for numerous eventualities including preparing an extra Inflatable
Rescue Boat (IRB), discussing the potential need for additional resources from
a neighbouring beach, and setting up a very intensive area for lifeguard
surveillance.
Events
At approximately 11.30am, the surf size increased, and the power of the inshore
drift increased accordingly. A group of four swimmers were suddenly swept
into a hole, then continued to drift rapidly into an extremely dangerous area
close to rocks. The lifeguards lost sight of three of the swimmers, and the team
went into crisis mode to deal with a rapidly dynamic and dangerous situation.
The patrolled area was closed, and other beach users ordered from the water as
the lifeguard team dealt with the crisis. All persons were eventually rescued;
one swimmer was found submerged. He was retrieved from the water and
resuscitation was commenced on the beach. He was transported to hospital by a
rescue helicopter and made a full recovery without any long-term neurological
consequences. During the incident, information was received by members of
the public of a possible sighting of one missing person early in the search in a
location at the other end of the beach causing doubt as to the appropriateness of
initial search efforts (this was later proved to be a ‘red herring’ and search
efforts were successful as the team leader elected to ignore the reliability of the

Published by ScholarWorks@BGSU, 2020

3

International Journal of Aquatic Research and Education, Vol. 12, No. 2 [2020], Art. 2

report). Several more rescues occurred throughout the day after the patrolled
area was re-opened.
Commentary
These events highlight how quickly lifeguard operations can shift from routinemode to crisis-mode. In the final analysis, this team did a remarkable job under
trying circumstances. In the next section, we highlight how the attributes of
chronic unease may be useful in preparing and dealing with such situations. In
the analysis of this case study, we do not criticise the actions of the team; rather
we use this case as an example to highlight the use of the attributes of chronic
unease in the real world. Adopting a world view that fosters the attributes of
chronic unease will not prevent such crisis from occurring per se but may help
build resiliency in a team to prevent and deal with such situations. We view this
situation as wearing a ‘cloak of chronic unease’ to see what thought processes
and actions might augment how we manage human and physical resources to
prepare for crises like these.
Attributes of Chronic Unease
Safety Imagination. The ability to mentally project the development of
a situation into the future based on its current state. The thinking here is that in
a state of chronic unease, the lifeguard will gather as much intelligence about
the situation at hand based on good evidence. Good evidence is data that can be
validated such as tide times, observation of actual not assumed hazards, and
aspects of the environment such as the actual surf size, velocity of rips and drift,
and water temperature. A lifeguard wearing a cloak of chronic unease will
assume their perception of the situation may be flawed or incomplete. To ensure
their intelligence is accurate, they will ‘cross-check’ their world view with
others in the team.
After gathering data to construct the current state of affairs, the lifeguard
will then speculate on the potential situation that may develop. This is the crux
of safety imagination. It is the ability to look beyond the here and now and
mentally project into the future using pre-existing knowledge, skills and
experience, and the combined thinking power of the team. An example of
dialogue a lifeguard team leader might use exemplifying a safety imagination
might sound like: “OK team, I’m concerned that the outgoing tide may produce
unsafe conditions, so we need to be prepared for extra vigilance on the turn of
the tide.” By declaring a possible future, the team is now aware of an unease
about safety in the future. Disaster may not strike, but if it does, it is partially
expected and therefore easier to deal with.
In the case study, the lifeguard team leader did in-fact pre-empt (using
safety imagination) many aspects of the clinical management of the victim who
submerged. As soon as the three victims went missing, the team leader closed
the beach (preventing further task overloading), immediately notified the rescue
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helicopter, and asked for further assistance from a neighbouring beach. The
swimmers had not been located at this time, so there was no way of knowing
medical aid was required, but the leader projected a worst-case scenario and
made preparations. All ‘just in case.’ These pre-emptive actions saved lives.
Safety imagination can be used by all lifeguards on a daily basis. Its use
need not only be used for major events; in fact, when safety imagination is used,
all events (even minor ones) are viewed as potential initiators of significant
future events, so are dealt with immediately, thereby interrupting a potential
cascade or escalation. An example of this would be the lifeguard who is
watching a small child slowly edge closer and closer to a deep hole. Based on
the current state, all may seem well, but if the future is projected, a potential
emergency exists. Better to act now before events cascade into a crisis. For
experienced lifeguards, reading this may seem patronising. After all, “isn’t that
what we do?” However, maintaining a constant state of safety imagination isn’t
as easy as it sounds. It is cognitively draining and requires a constant internal
dialogue to maintain. It is when we become complacent that safety imagination
fades, and relatively minor events can creep through unnoticed and become
significant events.
Pessimism. A personality trait reflecting a tendency to resist
complacency and to anticipate failure. Are you someone who has a little voice
in their head that runs scripts like: “No. Can't be that bad, he'll be fine,
everything is O.K.,” despite compelling evidence to the contrary? There are a
number of scripts that can run contrary to the reality of any given situation.
These are complex cognitive errors beyond the scope of this article. Suffice to
say, a personality trait that resists the urge to dismiss weak signals (and operate
as though ‘everything is OK’) when events are unravelling takes discipline and
practice. Conversely, a script that runs closer to: “Everything seems OK right
now, but conditions are worsening so it might all turn bad at any moment!” is
a script underpinned by healthy pessimism. This trait needs to be a habit and is
dominant in HROs (Weick, 2007).
In this case study, the lifeguard team leader displays a healthy sense of
pessimism. Right from the outset, he was clearly anxious about conditions, the
lack of resources to deal with challenging conditions, and his experience led
him to adopt a very pessimistic, vigilant and intensive patrolled area (the flags
were very close together to contain beach users in an area of high surveillance).
On the day, he had prepared an extra IRB (beyond what is normally prepared),
and had it on standby, just in case. This is healthy pessimism in action. There
were no strong signals that things could go wrong and require another IRB, but
there were weak signals there was potential for its need, so action was taken.
Is there anything wrong with being pessimistic, resisting the urge to be
complacent and therefore taking steps to anticipate failure? It’s all about context
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and intensity. Being overly pessimistic about every situation in every area of
one’s life can lead to cognitive distortions (catastrophising, for example) that
can be pathological. There are many types of cognitive distortions;
catastrophising (one type) distorts one’s view of the everyday world
disproportionately and irrationally and can lead to an individual disengaging
with everyday activities or produce anxiety when dealing with relatively minor
problems (Burns, 1989) . A catastrophising script might sound like: “Why
bother, people always need rescuing, and they always get into trouble when
there’s surf. We always end up doing rescues.” Distortions like these are ‘all or
nothing’ thinking versus a reasoned decision to consider catastrophe possible
but remain anchored in the reality that it doesn’t always happen or is guaranteed.
If you've developed the habit of pessimism, this trait runs
subconsciously in the background of thought and becomes dominant when
you're receiving weak signals that something is wrong. Experienced effective
lifeguards and team leaders naturally do this most of the time, and it largely
goes unnoticed by others, often surprising others when things do go wrong that
the team leader seems to possess savant-like qualities in predicting future events
and an ability to be ‘ahead of the eight-ball.’ It’s no accident. They are, and
perhaps unaware that their dominant behaviour is to be cautiously pessimistic.
To our knowledge, no research has confirmed this underlying trait is dominant
amongst experienced lifeguards. Research into this would be useful to
potentially identify leaders and lifeguards who have this trait, why they have
this trait, and how to train lifeguards to develop this trait as it is desirable and
needs fostering.
A lifeguard may also take a healthy dose of pessimism when planning a
difficult rescue. Sure, we all like to think we can perform amazing feats of IRB
driving or surf swimming in difficult conditions. A healthy dose of pessimistic
self-questioning might scale back your immediate expectations of what you
think you should do to a more realistic position of what you can do in reality. A
healthy dose of pessimism may prevent cavalier actions. Pessimistic questions
might include:
“But when was the last time I did a rescue in such large surf? Do I have
skilled help to assist? What if it all goes wrong? Where is my back-up if I get
into difficulty? There’s only one IRB available and no other experienced
drivers. Is there a better, safer way? Perhaps a jet-ski or helicopter?”
Confidence and competence is a double-edged sword. On one level, a
certain level of confidence in one’s competence is desirable. It is a basic human
need to avoid feelings of helplessness and the ability to influence the world
around us according to our own goals. “Our internal assessment of competence
is subjective either as a feeling of measuring up to the situation, or as a feeling
of helplessness and fear, as the case may be.” (St. Pierre, 2008). Research in
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similar industries such as clinical medicine identifies that confidence in (our
own) skills or capabilities is often misleading, and highly subjective, especially
in complex situations. For example, if a clinician overestimates their ability to
cope with an emergency, they are “more likely to take risks because of a wrong
feeling of being up to the task,” whereas if a clinician underestimates their
competence they will tend to “act defensively and refrain from taking helpful
necessary steps.” (St. Pierre, 2008).
A moral hazard exists when lifeguards either over or under-estimate
their competence when faced with an emergency. Over-estimation might lead
to unnecessary risks being taken in a hazardous environment. Under-estimation
might lead to circumstances where delayed or no action occurs where it is
absolutely needed. The attribute of pessimism is, therefore, not only useful for
being prepared for potential catastrophe but may also be a useful mind-trait to
keep competence in perspective and balance.
Vigilance. The ability to notice and identify (weak) signals of risks in
the environment. Vigilance is a highly desirable trait for lifeguards to possess.
Watching in-water patrons constantly is physically and cognitively demanding.
Dr. Tom Griffiths (the inventor of the five-minute scanning strategy) states:
“constant vigilant supervision is an oxymoron” (Griffiths, 2011).
It is not often appreciated that there are a vast number of variables that
influence a lifeguard’s level of vigilance, and therefore, ability to detect
drowning behaviour. Even in optimum circumstances where a lifeguard is
highly vigilant, he or she is prone to errors originating from a wide range of
host, cognitive, physiological and experiential factors, as well as a wide range
of environmental factors. Maintaining vigilance to the task of surveillance is
another double-edged sword. While engaged in surveillance, a lifeguard’s
perception is narrowed to the target area so as a result, and in a wider sense,
situational awareness diminishes. A lifeguard who attempts to maintain overall
situational awareness, complete other tasks or assignments, and pay a high
degree of attention to surveillance will compromise their effectiveness at all of
them. It is for this reason that a lifeguard should always conduct each task
independently, never both (or all) at the same time. When conducting
surveillance, they should only be involved in surveillance due to the risk of
becoming distracted and then fall prey to inattentional blindness (a phenomenon
where perception is impaired due to distraction).
Research conducted by Page et al. has identified that a lifeguard’s
experience is the only reliable independent variable influencing detection of
drowning behaviour in a simulated drowning (Page, 2011). A detailed analysis
and explanation of errors is beyond the scope of this paper, however, a basic
understanding that vigilance alone does not guarantee successful detection of
drowning behaviour is sufficient to examine the attribute of vigilance as it
pertains to chronic unease.
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In the context of chronic unease, looking for weak signals goes beyond
scanning for overt signs of distress or drowning behaviour. These signals are
strong, not weak. Looking for weak signals is about looking for problems that
when seen in isolation may have little if any immediate consequence, but if
allowed to persist or go unaddressed may escalate into a bigger problem or
influence in an unexpected way the outcome of an entirely different problem by
becoming a latent condition.
In our case study, the team leader divided tasks so no lifeguard was
conducting surveillance alone (two lifeguards reduce the likelihood of a single
point of failure) and maintained situational awareness by ensuring he remained
‘task-free’. He was then able to detect weak signals such as the tidal changes, a
subtle increase in surf size, and an increase in rip current velocity that may have
otherwise remained unnoticed by the team as a whole as other lifeguard’s fields
of perception are narrowed by conducting high-intensity surveillance. Overall,
these changes in the environmental conditions were not drastic changes; no
single signal meant much, but when combined, signalled a more sinister
situation developing. Maintaining vigilance (particularly good situational
awareness) is a good antidote for preventing a perception error known as change
blindness. In change blindness, the observer may miss signals because the
changes (a new or changed stimulus) within the field of perception change
slowly and go unnoticed (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997).
Vigilance, when combined with projecting a potential future using
safety imagination, identifies weak signals that can trigger further unease. Using
the attributes of chronic unease, HROs reduce accidents and errors by taking
action to avert (by fixing the condition) or plan for failure. Reporting relatively
minor issues (hazards and risks) is encouraged and rewarded. In environments
such as these, potential unexpected events or conditions are eliminated, isolated
or minimised (transformed) before they manifest further. Corrective actions are
transformed from urgent time-critical responses into planned responses,
reducing cognitive stressors, workload, and should it occur, expediting crisis
resolution.
Worry. A tendency to worry about risk and safety. Let’s be clear. The
workplace is no fun if everyone is worried all the time, and in the extreme, worry
can produce pathology. A tendency to worry about risk and safety (in a
measured way) is, however, the counterbalance to complacency, the basic tenet
of applying the attributes of chronic unease. HROs tend to place raising
concerns about risk and safety amongst teams as a high priority, and this
underpins many operational decisions. Organisations with a less safety-centric
focus often consider risk and safety as an afterthought or a separate process. In
our case study, the level of worry and concern for risk and safety is evidenced
by the team leader’s actions, such as maintaining an intensive patrolled area and
pre-preparing extra rescue assets. An interview with the team leader, in this
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case, reveals an underlying healthy predisposition with worry about risk and
safety versus complacency.
“I was worried at the beginning of the day and knew it was going to
be busy.”
“When things turned bad, I had already thought through my plan.”
“I worried about the flags (the patrolled area) so focused on
keeping those as tight as possible.”
“I didn’t have a decent break because I was worried things could
turn to sh^% at any moment.”
“I had already discussed with x patrol (neighbouring beach) the
plan to back us up if it turned to custard.”
As discussed, lifeguard work is complex and often undertaken in
suboptimal conditions. There are long periods of routine and mundane
surveillance combined with occasional periods of very intense physical activity
where the stakes are high. Failure to detect drowning behaviour or detecting it
but not providing flotation and rescue quickly enough can result in harm or
death of an in-water patron. This tension between the extremes (low arousal
versus hyperarousal) can in its own right create worry and tension in those
tasked with lifeguard operations. Most of the time there is the expectation that
nothing will go wrong, but there is also an expectation that one will be called
into action to rescue someone whose predicament is a result of not detecting
their behaviour soon enough. There is also the situation feared by all lifeguards
where a drowning victim shows no subtle or obvious signs of distress prior to
submersion. In these cases, it is usually a non-swimmer who lacks the ability to
float (although occasionally this can occur when a swimmer suddenly becomes
incapacitated due to a medical condition, eg. Epilepsy). In this regard, these
situations create an ever-present level of intra-personal worry and a daily
reminder of the importance of the role of a lifeguard (or anyone tasked with inwater supervision).
Excessive worry about risk and safety, however, can lead to anxiety, and
if that state is prolonged, is not healthy. The attributes of chronic unease call for
a healthy dose of worry centred on risk and safety that is present in the
background of thinking, but not so dominant it overwhelms normal cognitive
functioning or creates excessive physiological symptoms of stress. If worry
about risk and safety is a dominant state, one needs to address the underlying
reasons for its generation the same way as one addresses weak signals. The
conditions need to be identified and remedied before they snowball to become
a significant problem. Once addressed and the issue closed, worry is less likely
to build and become normalised. Eventually, if worry about certain conditions
become normalised, then complacency (in the form of apathy) is established,
which is not consistent with a positive safety culture. Lifeguards need to be
encouraged to express any worry they have about risk and safety to transform
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concerns into positive action (by addressing conditions creating the tension), in
turn reducing the levels of worry.
Figure 1. An ‘inverted U’ relationship between the usefulness of unease versus
the level of unease. Note that low levels of unease increase risk of complacency
and excessive levels of unease coupled with the usefulness of unease can induce
anxiety. There is an optimum level of unease in promoting usefulness (Fruhen,
2015).

Experience. Whether you have been involved in an incident before. A
hallmark of HROs is their ability to review failure and success to continuously
improve their systems, operations and individual performances. Experience
provides the basis for looking beyond the immediate task at hand by referencing
similar incidents and circumstances from the past, gaining an understanding of
the events surrounding those incidents, and learning from the lessons postincident.
In the area of medicine, it is true clinicians can have thought biases based
on the frequency and proximity of past events. If a new event presents similar
to one encountered previously, clinicians can be drawn to favour a clinical
diagnosis based on the previous like case. This form of reasoning is known as
rule-based reasoning, or more specifically frequency gambling, and is a
recognised pattern of reasoning amongst experts as a way of easing cognitive
load by using heuristics (‘short-cuts’) instead of reasoning in a deliberate, slow
way by creating a hypothesis, testing a theory and measuring the results. In highstakes environments, these cognitive short-cuts are highly effective at solving
most problems, but like all forms of reasoning is prone to errors. As discussed,
a detailed analysis of such errors is complex, and beyond the scope of this paper,
however, it is sufficient to understand that experience influences one’s ability
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to select appropriate rules to solve problems either successfully or not. Past
crises also influence behaviour and reasoning in the present. It is human nature
to overreact to a situation if a previous event like the one encountered didn't go
well or had less favourable outcomes. Reflecting on previous crises and the
lessons learnt can strengthen performance in the future and builds resiliency
(Weick, 2007). Experience of similar adverse events in the past gives a person
a ‘heads-up’ to the present and might shape an accurate mental model of the
situation that others may not share, as they may not have read the signals (weak
or strong) of an unfolding crisis.
At the same time, other members of the team may have experienced an
adverse event more recently than the team leader, and so they are more attuned
to recognising weak signals that lead to catastrophe. Their past experience opens
up patterns of recognition that others may not have recognised so a different
mental model of the situation at hand is formed and they have a ‘heads-up’ to
the potential seriousness of an otherwise weak signal. This early recognition
(right or wrong) is of no use unless the mental model is shared, otherwise it
serves no useful purpose other than hindsight. Encouraging sharing of mental
models is a crucial skill within teams that work in high-stakes environments and
deal with crises, and this process of communication is best facilitated in a team
with a flat hierarchy. A flattened hierarchy is encouraged during a crisis so team
members, no matter their position or rank in the hierarchy are encouraged to
speak up and share mental models, identify problems, offer solutions and
challenge conflicting ideas if required. For example: “Team leader, the last time
I saw a child showing signs of distress like this, he submerged very quickly…I
am curious why we are not responding,” may be all it takes for a team member
to share their mental model of the situation at hand, and escalated their concerns
about inaction, potentially jolting a team out of complacency into a state of
vigilance and action.
Thinking. Ability to question assumptions and not jumping to
conclusions. Thinking is complex. Explaining thinking even more so. If we
accept the reality that human thinking can be flawed, that we will and do err
with alarming frequency, then that mindfulness will serve us well when
analysing thought through the lens of chronic unease.
Crises and high stakes situations rob us of the time required for slow,
powerful thought, so there is a tendency to revert to rule-based thinking. Rightly
or wrongly, this default thinking can expedite a solution (if the right rule is
applied for the right situation). An individual with a habit of chronic unease
accepts there are occasional failings in their own and the team's reasoning and
the rules used to solve problems. They remain open to the possibility of other
solutions and encourage input from others. They have accepted the reality of
human limitation and the fragility of normal problem solving and functioning
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while under duress, so they use cognitive aids such as algorithms and checklists
to guide problem-solving and formulating a management plan.
In our case study, examples of where the attributes of chronic unease
shapes thinking is difficult to assess (as we don’t see someone’s thoughts),
however, such thinking manifests as behaviour, and we can see some behaviour
amongst the team and the leader that might indicate a dominant pattern of
thought that questions assumptions and avoids jumping to conclusions. We
propose the following behaviours are indicative of such thought in this case:
1. The decision to close the flags during the crisis was driven by the
assumption matters might get worse, not better quickly.
2. The decision to call emergency medical services and a rescue helicopter
early assumed a high potential for its need (despite clinical evidence) not
assuming ‘everything will be OK.’
3. The decision to call for support early from a neighbouring beach’s lifeguards
as an additional resource versus assuming the team could handle the
situation despite an initial impression that the team was in control of the
situation.
4. The team leader received information early in the initial crisis about a
sighting at the other end of the beach. This information was well-meaning
but conflicted with the team’s mental model that the victim was located
elsewhere. The team leader questioned the information and arrived at a
logical conclusion it was probably inaccurate, so avoided jumping to
conclusions on one small piece of irrelevant information.
Questioning assumptions is a vital skill, especially during periods of
duress. During a crisis, information can be scarce, unreliable, and become
irrelevant quickly as the situation changes rapidly (St. Michael, 2008). Effective
leadership during such times requires collaboration with other team members to
assertively challenge the validity of information, quickly disregard irrelevant
information, but at the same time, remain open to other possibilities versus
jumping to conclusions. Cross-checking and recapping information frequently
amongst team members using effective communication is one antidote to
building a platform for questioning information and the avoidance of jumping
to conclusions as it cross-references mental models and allows for clarification
in case of assumption. Communication errors amongst teams under duress have
been identified that can contribute to a faulty team performance in a critical
situation. Avoiding these errors is especially important in the early phases of
crisis as incorrect assumptions at the outset can lead the team into actions that
are also wrong or flawed. While detailed analysis of communications errors is
also beyond the scope of this paper, in summary, common communication
errors identified in critical situations include: Unspecified receiver, problems
with articulation and terms, information overload, team members becoming
‘tight-lipped’, conflicts resolved with passivity or aggressiveness, poor
listening, and unclear relationships (St .Michael, 2008).
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Summary: Chronic Unease to Rescue-Ready
Chronic unease is not a novel concept and while originally developed by Shell
for senior managers in a high-stakes industry such as oil and gas, the attributes
of a chronic unease mindset have been identified amongst other HROs where
preoccupation around safety and risk are dominant features of their safety
culture. The authors of this paper propose that the attributes of chronic unease,
as described by experts in this area, could be a powerful state of being lifeguards
can adopt to improve individual and team performance to assist the avoidance
of failure and errors by empowering lifeguards to structure their thinking around
risk and safety, and identifying conditions that can lead to failure early.
While recognising the concept of chronic unease already exists, we see
subtle differences in the application to a lifeguarding context. Firstly, chronic
unease is predominantly focused on accident and error prevention in high-risk
industries, and secondly, these settings (while the stakes for failure are high) are
not primarily focused on a single task such as surveillance and rescue. The
attributes of chronic unease are, therefore, a holistic mindset applicable to all
areas of industrial processes. This mindset is of use to the individual lifeguard
conducting surveillance, and the lifeguard team leader charged with managing
a team of lifeguards in a dynamic environment, producing a change in
organisational culture that could potentially influence policymakers. We have
called this mindset “Rescue-Ready” to distinguish the attributes of chronic
unease in the lifeguarding context. It succinctly captures the overall goal of
thinking in such a manner. It has connotations of a lifeguard who is thinking
about all the aspects of rescue, acting to prevent the need for rescue, but is at a
moment’s notice, ready for rescue. No matter the terminology, the overall goal
of discussing a mindset we propose is called Rescue-Ready is to highlight that
as a profession directly involved in managing risk and safety, the wider
lifeguard community can learn valuable lessons from other industries,
particularly HROs. There is a lack of scientific studies investigating many
aspects of lifeguard practice. The few that do exist are focused on technical
skills (e.g., surveillance or swimming ability) versus underlying human factors
underpinning reasoning, communication, teamwork, errors, decision-making
and attitudes. We believe more research is needed in this area; in particular,
qualitative research methodologies to investigate what are common underlying
attributes of highly effective lifeguard behaviours and thinking. This would
provide some evidence to support our hypothesis that highly effective lifeguards
display many attributes described within a state of chronic unease. The case
study used in this paper has exemplified a Rescue-Ready mindset and how this
creates positive results when used during a highly dangerous situation.
We propose the attributes of a Rescue-Ready mindset be included in
basic lifeguard training as the profession strives to be as error and accident-free
as humanly possible. Instruction in human factors like these is relatively new,
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and in a profession where the stakes of failure are so high, is too important not
to be included at all levels of lifeguard operations.
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